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Lowe: American Seizure of Amelia Island

AMERICAN SEIZURE OF AMELIA ISLAND
by RICHARD G. LOWE

I

1817 THE United States took actions at a small island off
the northeast coast of Florida which aroused protests from
the Spanish government. A band of South American adventurers
had occupied Spanish-owned Amelia Island in June and had been
using their base as a smugglers’ gateway into Georgia and the
southern states. In December 1817, the United States purged
the island of its invaders, apparently trying to get rid of this group
of troublesome ruffians and smugglers that were agitating along
the southern border. A closer examination of this event, however, reveals an additional motive as well.
Amelia Island is small, about as large as Manhattan Island.
Located some fifteen miles northeast of Jacksonville, it is one
of the sea islands lying off the coast of Georgia and Florida. In
1817 the only settlement was the village of Fernandina at the
north end of the island.
The small Spanish garrison on Amelia Island in 1817 was
soon to meet an ambitious general and adventurer, Sir Gregor
MacGregor. Born of Scottish nobility in 1786, he was later attracted by the struggle of the South American colonies for independence. He journeyed to Venezuela to join the revolutionaries and there met and married Senora Josefa Lovera. 1 After
some campaigning for his wife’s native land, MacGregor left South
America and found his way to Philadelphia.
In that city he received a military commission on March 31,
1817, from three South Americans, Lino de Clemente of Venezuela, Pedro Gual of New Granada and Mexico, and Martin
Thompson of Rio de la Plata. 2 The commission instructed MacGregor to liberate East and West Florida from Spanish power,
and called for “due observance of the laws of the United States,
and particularly those regulating their neutrality. . . .” 3 Ironically,
N

1. T. Frederick Davis, “MacGregor’s Invasion of Florida, 1817,” Florida
Historical Quarterly, VII (July 1928), 3.
2. Clemente, Gual, and Thompson were not legal deputies of the countries they professed to represent. See fn 35.
3. Commission in American State Papers: Foreign Relations, 6 vols.
(Washington, 1833-1859), IV, 415.
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MacGregor’s recruiters had themselves violated United States
neutrality laws by operating in an American city.
MacGregor naively believed that the American government
would be pleased with his campaign against the Floridas. He
intended to encourage the Florida inhabitants to attach themselves to the United States, since he believed no other power
could hope to control the territory adequately. Florida’s geographic position made these regions a natural extension of their
northern neighbor. 4
The Scottish adventurer left Philadelphia and began recruiting sailors, adventurers, and street brawlers in Baltimore, Charleston, and Savannah. 5 By various means he acquired funds and
patrons who promised him more men and money. One of the
principal methods used to acquire resources was to offer land
in Florida for a dollar an acre. 6 After gathering his provisions
and men, MacGregor sailed from southern Georgia to Amelia
Island. There he and his fifty-four followers landed and marched
through mud and marshes to the village of Fernandina. On
June 29 the Spanish commander, Don Francisco de Morales,
gave up the island and his garrison of eighty-four men without
a fight. Amelia passed from the possession of the King of Spain
to that of Gregor MacGregor. 7
The Scottish leader addressed his forces on July 1, praising
their accomplishments and stating their aim: “To free the whole
of the Floridas from tyranny and oppression.” 8 Despite this highsounding proclamation, MacGregor’s major concern seems to have
been profits rather than patriotism. He was prepared to sell
the newly “liberated” territory to the United States “for the most
he could get” if Spain threatened his project with force. More4.
5.

6.
7.

8.

State Papers and Publick Documents of the United States (Boston,
1819), XII, 390-91.
For a detailed description of MacGregor’s activities in the United
States and at Amelia written “by one concerned,” possibly a participant, see Washington Daily National Intelligencer, October 10, 1817,
and succeeding issues.
Davis, “MacGregor’s Invasion,” 7.
Vicente Pazos to James Monroe, December 23, 1817, State Papers
and Publick Documents of the United States, XII, 408; Washington
Daily National Intelligencer, October 3, 10, 1817. For the surrender
terms see Niles’ Weekly Register, August 2, 1817, 365-66.
Annals of the Congress of the United States, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., p.
1814. Cited hereafter as Annals of Congress.
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over, during his stay on Amelia Island there were illegal sales
of African slaves to American buyers. 9
After the first days of confusion and disorganization, MacGregor began making some changes on the island. He established
a post office, ordered a printing press for the publication of his
many proclamations, and began issuing his own currency. He
entered into negotiations with privateers and buccaneers from
the West Indies, intending to make Amelia a depot to collect and
sell plunder taken from Spanish vessels. 10 He also planned to
advance on St. Augustine, aided by the inhabitants of the “Northern Division of East Florida.”
MacGregor’s activities in East Florida alarmed many citizens
in the United States. There had been much discussion recently
of a possible cession of the Floridas to the United States. “Should
a bargain have been struck between our minister at Madrid and
the Spanish government, for the Floridas, how can it be carried
into effect, if Sir Gregor M’Gregor takes possession of St. Augustine and Pensacola?” 11 Furthermore, many of the inhabitants
around Amelia Island seemed opposed to the South American
forces; an observer at the scene noted that settlers in that region
desired a cession of the Floridas to the United States. 12 Apparently
MacGregor’s seizure of Amelia had added a troublesome third
party to preliminary negotiations between Spain and the American government.
The Scottish general’s project soon foundered, however. Disease, death, and desertion quickly thinned his army’s ranks;
junior officers began quarreling among themselves, and the troops
became insubordinate and disorderly. When his American patrons failed to deliver the much-needed arms and reinforcements
which had been promised and when he learned that Spanish
9.

For evidence that MacGregor was willing to sell out see the unsigned
letter to Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, January 19, 1818,
State Papers and Publick Documents of the United States, XII, 398.
For indications of illegal proceedings at Amelia during MacGregor’s
control see Charleston Courier, July 19, 1817, and Charles Francis
Adams, ed., Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, 12 vols. (Philadelphia,
1874-1877), IV, 75.
10. State Papers and Publick Documents of the United States, XII, 390;
Washington Daily National Intelligencer, September 5, 1817; Davis,
“MacGregor’s Invasion,” 18.
11. Washington Daily National Intelligencer, July 25, 1817, reprinted
from the Alexandria (Va.) Gazette.
12. Charleston Courier, September 19, 1817.
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Governor Coppinger was planning to move against Amelia Island,
MacGregor decided to withdraw. He resigned his commission
on September 4, 1817, and sailed away, leaving the command
to Jared Irwin, former congressman from Pennsylvania, and
Ruggles Hubbard, once sheriff of New York. 13
Amelia, however, was not to be free of filibusters; another
privateer, Luis Aury, was already enroute to the island aboard
his brig Mexico Libre. Like MacGregor, Aury had been in the
service of the Latin American republics for several years, and
had commanded the navy of New Granada for several months
in 1813-1814. From the profits gained by raiding Spanish
shipping, Aury had built his own private fleet which he staffed
with Haitians. In September 1816, he allied with an abortive
Mexican Republic and established a base at Galveston Bay on
the coast of Texas where he continued his raids on Spanish vessels
in the Gulf. Following two mass desertions by some of his followers, and perhaps fearful of an American occupation of Galveston, Aury decided to continue his operations off the Florida
East coast. In late July 1817, the former Cartegenan commander
and Galveston raider set sail for Fernandina, planning to join
Gregor MacGregor there. 14
After reaching Amelia Island in mid-September, 15 Aury
13.

14.

15.

Washington Daily National Intelligencer, October 13, 1817. MacGregor had been having similar troubles since July 1817. See the
letter from Jersey Point, Georgia, to the Charleston Courier, July 25,
1817, and the issues of August 6 and 8.
Stanley Faye, “Commodore Aury,” Louisiana Historical Quarterly,
XXIV (1941), 622-44. In actual fact, by the time Aury began
operating under his Mexican commission, the so-called government
which had issued it had been dispersed and dissolved by Spanish
forces. Thus, Aury could not truly claim that his actions at Galveston
and Amelia Island were sanctioned by any existing government. See
Captain J. D. Henley and Major James Bankhead to James Monroe,
January 10, 1818, State Papers and Publick Documents of the United
States, XII, 400-01. See also Aury’s address of December 12, 1817,
to the Amelia legislature in the Charleston Courier, January 9, 1818,
and letters from Beverly Chew, customs collector in New Orleans, to
Secretary of the Treasury William Crawford, August 1, 30, 1817,
State Papers and Publick Documents of the United States, XI, 348-52.
There is some disagreement as to whether Aury arrived at the island
before MacGregor sailed away. An unsigned letter to Secretary of
State Adams claims that the two commanders met at Amelia. According to Aury, he arrived in Fernandina after MacGregor had left.
See ? to Adams, January 19, 1818, State Papers and Publick Documents of the United States, XII, 399, and Aury’s December 12, 1817
address to the Amelia legislature in the Charleston Courier, January
9, 1818.
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claimed it in the name of Mexico. A Georgia planter described
the buccaneer’s succession to power: Aury declared that “. . .
the flag of the Florida republic must be struck, and that of the
Mexican hoisted; and that Fernandina should be considered as
a conquest of the Mexican republic. . . .” 16 The new commander dismissed MacGregor’s claim to the Floridas on the
grounds that he had invaded the area without a valid commission.
Jared Irwin and Ruggles Hubbard opposed Aury when he first
appeared in Fernandina, but they eventually yielded to his
stronger forces. 17
Under Aury Amelia Island became a base for naval assaults
on Spanish shipping and a depot for contraband slaves. The
Mexican freebooter commissioned privateers and sent them out
into the Gulf and the Caribbean, where, according to reports
received in London by the first of November, they performed so
well that prize goods valued at $500,000 had been sold in Fernandina. 18 One observer noted that even before the end of
September, Aury had captured a “number of prizes of considerable value.” 19 According to another resident, Aury in two
months had sold more than 1,000 slaves into Georgia, utilizing
the winding rivers and small inlets along the coast for this lucrative trade. 20
Meanwhile, the United States became increasingly more
concerned with what was going on in East Florida. In October
1817, President Monroe consulted with his cabinet on the advisability of seizing the Fernandina settlement, and preparations
began for American military involvement. 21 On December 22,
16. McIntosh to Crawford, October 30, 1817, American State Papers:
Foreign Relations, IV, 138.
17. Conflicts between Aury and his followers on one side, and Irwin and
Hubbard’s group on the other, repeatedly erupted from September to
November. Some observers of the activities on Amelia feared widespread bloodshed before a definite power status could be established.
By early November Aury had gained enough authority to proclaim
martial law on the island. See the Charleston Courier, October 21,
24, 1817. For Aury’s proclamation of martial law see ibid., November
14, 1817.
18. Faye, “Commodore Aury,” 644-45.
19. Thomas Wayne to Benjamin Homans, September 27, 1817, State
Papers and Publick Documents of the United States, XI, 385.
20. Davis, “MacGregor’s Invasion,” 4 5 . S e e a l s o t h e l e t t e r o f C a p t a i n
John H. Elton to the Secretary of the Navy, November 15, 1817,
State Papers and Publick Documents of the United States, XI, 381.
21. For the orders preparing for American seizure of Amelia see State
Papers and Publick Documents of the United States, XI, 403-04,
407-08.
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1817, a naval force under Captain J. D. Henley and an army detachment under Major James Bankhead appeared off Amelia
Island. The commanders informed Aury that they were under
orders to take possession of Amelia “as soon as it will be convenient for your troops to evacuate it.” 22
Aury informed the Americans that he would submit their
request to his government’s representatives and would presently
inform them of their decision. 23 In the meantime, he assured
the commanders he would offer no resistance in force. He insisted that his government was not only genuine, but that it
posed no danger to the United States: “As we consider the people
of the United States as unquestionably the only free people on
the surface of the globe, we cannot admit that you have now
become the adherents of a tyrant [the King of Spain]; otherwise,
your demand is inadmissable and unjustifiable in the eyes of the
world; and if we must yield to it, all the blame rests with you.” 24
He denied that any unlawful practices had occurred at Amelia
and asked that his letter be sent on to Washington so as to convince President Monroe that his island establishment was legitimate. Aury’s eloquent rhetoric did not prevent the American
occupation, and on December 23, 1817, Major Bankhead’s troops
took control of Amelia Island without resistance. 25
Aury and Dr. Pedro Gual, who had earlier signed MacGregor’s Philadelphia commission, protested the American occupation to the United States government. Lino de Clemente’s
agent Vicente Pazos, also protested in the name of Venezuela. 26
Clemente’s letter contained an interesting observation, blustery
as it was: “The motives alleged by the Government of the United
States, in justification of their hostile measure, serve to prove

J. D. Henley and James Bankhead to Luis Aury, December 22, 1817,
Annals of Congress, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 1803-04.
23. Aury to Henley and Bankhead, December 22, 1817, ibid., 1804.
24. I b i d . , 1 8 0 5 .
2 5 . I b i d . , 1 8 0 1 . F o r A u r y ’s D e c e m b e r 2 3 n o t e o f p e a c e f u l s u r r e n d e r
see ibid., 1806. American forces remained in control of the island
until after Spain surrendered Florida to the United States in 1821.
See James G. Forbes to Andrew Jackson, May 7, 1821, American
State Papers: Foreign Relations, IV, 744, and Clarence Carter, ed.,
Territorial Papers of the United States, 26 vols. (Washington, 18351962), XXII, 20 fn.
26. Pazos to Monroe, December 23, 1817, State Papers and Publick Documents of the United States, XII, 408.
22.
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their own futility, and clearly demonstrate that the sole object
was the acquisition of the Floridas. . . .” 27
With the island occupied by American forces and with his
diplomatic objections falling on deaf ears, Aury vacated Amelia
and began making plans for an expedition against the Isthmus
of Panama. 28 He was last heard of in a report appearing in a
Nassau paper in 1820 that his buccaneering ships were operating
off the coast of Cuba. 29
Meanwhile, on January 8 and 24, Luis de Onis, minister to
the United States, protested the American seizure of Spanish
territory. Onis insisted that the United States had no cause to
30
Secretary of State John Quincy
sanction such acts of violence.
Adams answered Spain’s objections on January 16 and March
12, 1818, and in effect claimed that the United States’ actions were justified. Adams referred the Spanish ambassador to
President Monroe’s message to Congress on January 13 in which
the President claimed that Spain’s inability to control her Florida
territories and the pending negotiations between the two countries
for the area, were some of the reasons which compelled the
United States to take this positive action. 31 Unofficially it was
believed that Secretary Adams favored holding Amelia Island
subject to continued negotiations with Spain. He also seemed
to share a fear that adventurers might take the Floridas while
the United States was involved in bargaining for them with Spain.
Hearing of a possible re-invasion of Amelia by Gregor MacGregor
in the spring of 1818, Adams “ . . . urged that if we should
not come to an early conclusion of the Florida negotiation, Spain
would not have the possession of Florida to give us.” 32
In order to understand Washington’s reaction to the Amelia
27.
28.

29.
30.
31.
32.

William R. Manning, ed., Diplomatic Correspondence of the United
States Concerning the Independence of the Latin-American Nations,
3 vols. (New York, 1925), II, 1175.
Luis Aury became embroiled in the Venezuelan and Granadan struggles for autonomy during the next four years. He was thrown from
a horse on an island in the Gulf of Mexico and died from the fall
on August 30, 1821. Faye, “Commodore Aury,” 647, 697, passim.
Nassau Royal Gazette, August 16, 1820, in A. J. Hanna and Kathryn
Abbey Hanna, Florida’s Golden Sands (Indianapolis, 1950), 4 8 .
For Onis’ protests see American State Papers: Foreign Relations, IV,
464-68.
For Adams’ replies to Onis see ibid., 463-64, 468-78. For Monroe’s
message of January 13 to Congress see the discussion on page 26.
Adams, ed., Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, IV, 36, 42.
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occupation, governmental proceedings from December 2, 1817,
three weeks before actual American occupation, must be considered. On that day President Monroe sent a joint message to
Congress in which he noted both MacGregor’s and Aury’s activities in Florida. He described Amelia as being “ . . . a channel
for the illicit introduction of slaves from Africa into the United
States, an asylum for fugitive slaves from the neighboring States,
and a port for smuggling of every kind.” The President expressed
the fear that conflict between Spain and her colonies would have
an adverse effect on United States shipping and commerce in
the surrounding area.
The MacGregor expedition, Monroe
stated, was an unauthorized adventure financed by sources within
the United States. 33
Monroe added another point for Congress to consider. Florida, surrounded by the United States, for months had been a
subject of negotiation with Spain as indemnity for spoliation
losses. 34 The United States was surprised that the Latin American colonies countenanced the filibusters’ seizure of Amelia. 35
Not only had American smuggling and neutrality laws been
violated, but apparently efforts were being made to block possible
expansion into Florida; American-Spanish negotiations would be
superfluous if Florida was occupied by a third force. For this
reason, and in order to protect the country’s interests, 36 the
33.

James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers
of the Presidents, 1789-1902, 11 vols. (New York, 1897), II, 13.
34. As early as August 1817, the Floridas were mentioned by a Spanish
minister in Madrid as the objects of a possible cession to the United
States. See Jose Pizarro to George W. Erving, August 17, 1817; and
Erving to Pizarro, August 19, 1817, American State Papers: Foreign
Relations, IV, 447, 449. During the summer and autumn of 1817
Niles' Weekly Register repeatedly alluded to negotiations for a Florida cession. For example see the issues of July 19, September 6, and
December 20.
35. By March 1818, Monroe was informed by the Latin American nations
concerned that they disapproved of MacGregor’s and Aury’s activities
in Florida and that the two adventures had no authority from any
of the South American governments to take any action whatsoever.
See Monroe’s message to the House of Representatives, March 25,
1818, in Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, II, 32.
See also American State Papers: Foreign Relations, IV, 271, 292, 412,
for the opinions of Buenos Aires, Chile, and Venezuela.
36. The President was vigorously supported in his decision to seize the
island by General Andrew Jackson. This future president wrote
Monroe a letter on January 6, 1818, in which he urged that the suppression order . . . be carried into execution at all hazards, and
simultaneously the whole of East Florida seized, and held as indemnity for the outrages of Spain upon the property of our citizens.”
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President concluded that the Amelia establishment should be
suppressed. 37
Three weeks after the American landing of December 23,
President Monroe sent another message to Congress. In this
second report on Amelia Island, Monroe announced that the
suppression had succeeded and without bloodshed. There was,
therefore, “good cause to believe that the consummation of a
project fraught with much injury to the United States had been
prevented.” 38 The President justified his order, saying that whenever Spain could not maintain authority and order in her own
territories, “her jurisdiction for the time necessarily ceases to
exist,” 39 but the United States did not plan to “make any conquest of Amelia Island from Spain or to injure in any degree
the cause of the colonies.” 40 Monroe reiterated his arguments
of December 2: “When we consider the persons engaged in it,
being adventurers; . . . the territory on which the establishments
were made . . ., on a part of East Florida, a Province in negotiation between the United States and Spain; the claim of their
leader . . . comprising the whole of both the Floridas, without excepting that part of West Florida which is incorporated into the
State of Louisiana; their conduct while in the possession of the
island . . ., it may fairly be concluded that if the enterprise had
succeeded . . . much annoyance and injury would have resulted
from it to the United States.” 41
Monroe cited an 1811 enactment as legal sanction for his
military measures.
This act authorized the president to “take
possession of, and occupy, all or any part of the territory lying
east of the river Perdido [present-day western boundary of Florida], and south of the State of Georgia and the Mississippi
Territory, in case an arrangement has been, or shall be, made
with the local authority . . . or in the event of an attempt to
occupy the said territory, or any part thereof, by any foreign
Government. . . .” 42
J . S . B a s s e t t , e d . , C o r r e s p o n d e n c e o f A n d r e w J a c k s o n , 7 vols.
(Washington, 1926-1935), II, 345.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, II, 32.
Ibid., 23-24.
Ibid., 24.
Ibid., 24-25.
Ibid., 23.
Annals of Congress, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., 2602-03.
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In March 1818, President Monroe was still explaining the
United States’ action at Amelia. In his congressional message
of March 26, he commented on the protest sent in by Vicente
Pazos: “It appears by the letter of Mr. Pazos, agent of Commodore Aury, that the [Aury] project of seizing the Floridas was
formed and executed at a time when it was understood that Spain
had resolved to cede them to the United States. . . .” 43
In justifying its actions in supressing the establishment of
Amelia, the United States explained that the privateers’ base was
a haven for smugglers and a base of illegal slave trade, that the
commerce and property of American citizens were endangered
by the filibusters’ presence, and that the Floridas were threatened
by adventurers at a time when she and Spain were negotiating for
a cession of the territories. This latter is a fact that has been
generally overlooked by historians. Two legal justifications were
also mentioned by the United States: the filibusters had no unassailable authority from any South American government; 44 and
the law enacted by Congress in 1811 enabled the president to
order the occupation of Florida.
A majority of Congress and most of the cabinet favored
Monroe’s actions. He also had firm support for the seizure policy
from his Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams. Besides the
fact that he wanted Florida for the United States, Adams opposed
the filibusters’ designs on West Florida, a portion of which the
United States had gained as the result of a revolution a few
years earlier. In a report to the House Committee on Foreign
Relations in January 1818, Adams claimed that because a large
part of West Florida was already in the possession of the United
States, the privateers’ project involved designs of direct hostility. 45
Speaker of the House Henry Clay staunchly opposed the
occupation of Amelia Island on the grounds that it hindered
the Latin American struggle for independence. Secretary Adams
recorded in his diary that at a dinner party on December 24,
43. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, II, 32.
44. MacGregor’s commission had been issued in Philadelphia, thus rendering it invalid. Aury’s had expired with the republic that issued
it long before he reached Amelia Island. In any case, the governments of Latin America denied any connections with either of the
two commanders.
45. Worthington C. Ford, ed., Writings of John Quincy Adams, 7 vols.
(New York, 1913-1917), VI, 286.
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1817, Clay “came out with great violence against the course
pursued by the Executive upon South American affairs, and
especially in relation to Amelia Island.” 46 Unfortunately for
Clay, he had little support in opposing the Amelia suppression.
The subject of the occupation of Amelia Island was the
main item of business for the House on December 8, 1817.
According to John Rhea of Tennessee, the people of the United
States were quite interested in what was happening in Florida.
He stated that the establishment at Amelia had “already excited
much attention throughout the country, which would be still
more attracted to that point by the order given to suppress
them.” 47
Representative Hugh Nelson of Virginia favored the seizure
and opposed Henry Clay’s position on the subject: “Have they
not themselves given further proofs, if proofs are wanting, that
they are but a horde of buccaneers?” 48 Moreover, he staked,
“when this course shall be calmly and dispassionately scanned
and examined, the judgment of the American people, and of an
impartial posterity, will applaud the course, and see in it the
result of a wise, virtuous, and patriotic policy.” 49
A House committee was appointed on December 3 to report
on the illicit introduction of slaves from Amelia into the United
States. 50 Henry Middleton, a South Carolina representative and
chairman of the committee, delivered the group’s findings to the
House on January 10, 1818: “Your committee are of opinion,
that it is but too notorious, that numerous infractions of the
law prohibiting the importation of slaves into the United States
have been perpetrated with impunity upon our Southern frontier
. . . .” 51 Furthermore, he reported that if “the Floridas, or either
of them, had been permitted to pass into the hands of such a
Power, the committee are [sic] persuaded . . . to point out . . .
Allan Nevins. ed.. Diarv of John Quincy Adams, 1794-1845,. (New
York, 1951), 190.
47. Annals of Congress, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., 410.
4 8 . Ibid., 411.
49. Ibid., 412.
50. Members of the committee included Henry Middleton (South Carolina), James S. Smith (North Carolina), Nathaniel Upham (New
Hampshire), Lemuel Sawyer (North Carolina), William Lee Ball
(Virginia), George Mumford (North Carolina), and Zadock Cook
(Georgia). Ibid., 397-98, 405.
51. Ibid., 646.
46.
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the pernicious influence which such a destiny of the territories
in question must have had upon the security, tranquility, and
commerce of this nation.”5 2 According to Congressman Middleton, the objects of the campaign against Amelia by the South
Americans appeared to be the occupation of Florida, the spoliation of commerce by piratical privateers, smuggling, and illegal
slave trading with Americans. 53 The opinion of his committee,
then, was that the establishment at Amelia was a nuisance and
menace to the United States and deserved therefore to be suppressed.
A speech that has been generally overlooked in the Amelia
episode, but which should be considered for its historical significance, was one given by William Henry Harrison, congressman
from Ohio, on December 8, 1817. Mr. Harrison did not think
the reasons put forth for suppression by the President on December 2 were sufficient to authorize occupation of Amelia. In fact,
he stated, “that which seemed to be most relied upon was, that
a negotiation was pending between this country and Spain, for
the cession to us of their claim to the Floridas. . . .” 54 Mr. Harrison thought that if Aury or MacGregor “had succeeded in conquering all the Spanish part of the Floridas, . . . it would be
as easy to obtain it from them as from the King of Spain.” 55
Harrison’s emphasis on America’s fear of losing the Floridas was
not challenged by any member of the House; all seem to have
understood that the expansion of the United States into the
Floridas was a matter of great importance.
The seizure and occupation of Amelia Island by the United
States reveal two important facts. The inability of Spain to police
her territories adequately was demonstrated once more. MacGregor’s and Aury’s meager forces could easily have been ousted
from their pirates’ nest if the Spanish government had sent a force
superior in numbers and equipment. Ferdinand VII was unable
to do this; he could not provide enough men to control Florida
and protect it from adventurers and the United States. Secondly,
one of the major reasons, possibly the major reason, for United
States seizure of Amelia has been overlooked or ignored by writers
52. Ibid., 648.
53. Ibid., 649.
54. Ibid., 4 1 5 .
55. Ibid.
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of American diplomatic history. This was simply that the American government was expecting the cession of the Floridas to the
United States by Spain. With the expansionist ambitions of Jefferson and other Americans so near fulfillment, the United States
could not stand by and see revolutionary privateers seize their
hoped-for prize and upset negotiations with Spain. Therefore,
in order to obtain the Floridas and to rid the United States of a
nuisance, the American government purged Amelia Island of
adventurers and occupied it with troops in late December 1817.
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